By Elisa Aaltola, John Hadley
Debate in animal ethics wishes reenergizing. so far, philosophers have concerned about a comparatively restricted variety of particular issues when leaving metaphilosophical matters that require pressing awareness principally unexamined.
This well timed number of essays brings jointly new thought and significant views on key issues in animal ethics, foregrounding questions in relation to ethical prestige, ethical epistemology and ethical psychology. Is an individualistic process established upon capacities how one can flooring the ethical prestige of non-human animals or may still philosophers pursue relational views? What does it suggest to “know” animals and “speak” for them? what's the position of feelings reminiscent of disgust, empathy, and love, in animal ethics and the way does emotion tell the rationalism inherent in analytic animal ethics theory?
The assortment goals to develop the scope of animal ethics, rendering it extra together with very important modern philosophical topics and pushing the self-discipline in new directions.
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Extra info for Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy
8. Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2006). Nussbaum’s view is actually ambiguous: she argues against Rachels’s moral individualism for the relevance of a “Species Norm”, but her focus on speciesspecific capabilities does not carry over to other extrinsic properties such as social context and membership. Whether her view qualifies as intrinsicalist depends on whether species norms are intrinsic or extrinsic.
Churchland, “Folk Psychology (2)”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 308–16. 3. Nicholas Agar, Life’s Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 16. 4. Colin Allen and Michael Trestman, “Animal Consciousness”, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer Edition), ed. E. N. edu/ archives/sum2014/entries/consciousness-animal/, accessed 1 August 2014. 5. David DeGrazia, “Self-Awareness in Animals”, in The Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed.
A thing has moral status just in case harms to it matter morally. 34 Following this account of moral harm, moral status derives from the importance of harms, which is a function of their badness for the entity. The moral individualist might then infer: an entity’s status is strictly a function of its cognitive capacities. But note that this account does not rule out something’s badness-for a being arising from nonintrinsic factors, such as the being’s environment, relationships or others’ expectations and attitudes.