Download Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives by Quentin Smith, Aleksandar Jokic PDF

By Quentin Smith, Aleksandar Jokic

Realization is likely to be the main difficult challenge we people face in attempting to comprehend ourselves. right here, eighteen essays provide new angles at the topic. The individuals, who contain a number of the major figures in philosophy of brain, speak about such vital themes as intentionality, extraordinary content material, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the research of attention.

Show description

Read Online or Download Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives PDF

Best consciousness & thought books

Passion's Triumph over Reason: A History of the Moral Imagination from Spenser to Rochester

Passion's overcome cause offers a finished survey of rules of emotion, urge for food, and self-discipline in English literature and ethical considered the 16th and 17th centuries. In a story which pulls on tragedy, epic poetry, and ethical philosophy, Christopher Tilmouth explores how Renaissance writers remodeled their figuring out of the passions, re-evaluating emotion as a way to make it a huge constituent of moral existence instead of the enemy in which allegory had often solid it as being.

Ethics and the Will: Essays

The contribution made by way of the Vienna Circle to ethics and the philosophy of motion is more and more being well-known. right here formerly unpublished items through Moritz Schlick and his student Josef Schächter set the scene, exhibiting how ethics isn't depending on metaphysics yet does require a sensitivity to strata of language except that of technological know-how.

Self, no self? : perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions

'Self, No Self? ' is the 1st publication of its sort. It brings jointly prime philosophical students of the Indian and Tibetan traditions with top Western philosophers of brain and phenomenologists to discover concerns approximately recognition and selfhood from those a number of views. summary: Self, No Self?

Extra info for Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives

Example text

So, for Ted, there is no difference in phenomenal character. M and the mixture of lights look phenomenally the same shade to Ted. On the representationalist view, then, Ted visually represents M and the mixture of lights as having the same shade. Since Ted's experience is veridical, it follows that M and the mixture of lights have the same shade, contrary to the initial supposition. The representationalist, thus, should hold that the phenomenal character of Ted's experience of chip M is indeed different from that of Alice's experience of M.

The conclusion they draw is that experiences such as these cannot be described correctly in terms of their intentional content alone. Reply: I am not persuaded. It is certainly the case that when one presses one's eyeball, one has no inclination to think or judge that the number oflines of type has doubled. After all, the duplicate line is fainter than the original, and one knows full well what one is doing. So, in the epistemic or conceptual sense of the term 'appears', it does not appear that the number of lines has doubled.

EFRON, R. ' Boston Studies in Philosophy ofScience, 4: 159. GREGORY, R. (1990), Eye and Brain (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson). HARMAN, G. (1990), 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', in J. : Ridgeview). - - (1996), 'Qualia and Colour Concepts', in E. : Ridgeview). HARMON, LEON D. (1973), 'The Recognition of Faces', Scientific American (November), 75. JACKSON, F. (1977), Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ko SSLYN, S. : Harvard University Press). , and HEBBEN, N. (1982), 'Visual Recognition through Kinaesthetic Mediation', Psychological Medicine, 12: 515-3l.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.91 of 5 – based on 16 votes